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Abstract
The field of ecological economics includes both economic analysis on the one
hand, and discussions of values and visions for society, on the other. Using feminist
insights into cultural beliefs about the relative "hardness" and "softness" of these two
sides, this essay discusses how ecological economists can use this unique "between"
space in order to better inform policy. The current crisis of global climate change, it is
argued, requires that economists move beyond modeling and measurement, while
ecological thinkers need to re-examine beliefs about markets and profit.
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Between a Rock and a Soft Place:
Ecological and Feminist Economics in Policy Debates
Julie A. Nelson

I. Introduction
Economists are increasingly in the limelight in policy discussions about the
environment, and particularly in discussions about climate change. With the physical
science of greenhouse gases and their effects now well established, policy discussions, at
least in the United States, are focusing more and more on whether proposed mitigation or
adaptation policies will be "bad for the economy." Scholars of ecological economics are
often situated in the middle of this debate. On the one hand, many are trained in "hard"
economic measurement, modeling, and analysis, of the sort that is being called for by
many parties to these discussions. On the other hand, most people who take on the
"ecological" label (as compared to "environmental" or "natural resource" labels, which
are more associated with mainstream views) feel that the issues involved are in some way
also bigger than what can be contained in a narrow model--that is, we believe that issues
of how we connect with the rest of nature, of our values concerning justice and future
generations, and of envisioning new approaches to sustainability, are involved. Speaking
about visions, values, ethics, and connections, however, is culturally regarded as a
relatively vague and "soft" approach.
These varied intellectual and social roots of ecological economics put ecological
economists in a unique position, which holds the potential for the sorts of creative insight
that can only come about from opposites held in tension. Yet good outcomes will not
necessarily follow: Working from this liminal space also has its hazards. The purpose of
this essay is to suggest insights from feminist economics might help ecological
economists put this unique position to its best use.

II. The Rock and the Soft Place
What is meant by "the rock" and "the soft place" in this essay's title? The "rock"
side is traditional mainstream economics, or neoclassical orthodoxy, whose proponents
like to portray it as "hard," scientific and rigorous. This approach is centered on
mathematically formalized theories, quantitative measurement, and econometrics. The
core model is that of autonomous, rational agents maximizing utility. The orientation
tends to be towards static or short-run models, and when dynamics are attempted they
tend to be deterministic, or at least use known, thin-tailed probability distributions. The
theoretical underpinnings of standard cost/benefit analysis (CBA), with its concept of
"willingness to pay," are based in the evaluation of marginal changes. The analysis is
meant to appeal to the reason and logical capacity of decision-makers. It often provides
an aura of expertise and, perhaps, scientific certainty about the likely effect of policies.
The goal is a rational solution to the problem created by climate externalities.

2

GDAE Working Paper No. 09-06: Between a Rock and a Soft Place

As a result of a short-run orientation and marginalist focus, policy advice from
this front--for example, from William Nordhaus (2008)--often (at least in the United
States) tends to take on a gradualist, go-slow tenor. Actions are nearly always thought of
in terms of legislative or regulatory government policies that, it is assumed, must be
designed to create minimal "interference" with normal market and business functioning.
Carbon taxes and cap-and-trade to "get the prices right" are the most-often talked about
solutions, with perhaps some additional incentives for developing large-scale
technologies such as carbon capture and sequestration.
Some ecological economists start from, for the most part, this side. Although such
economists often break away from the usual assumptions in many ways, efforts are
focused on mathematical models, measurements, and conventional policies. The
emphasis is on developing better models, better measurements, and better legislative and
regulatory proposals.
The "soft place" side, on the other hand, starts with a more holistic, humanistic,
nature-centered, or even spiritual view. Discussions, in this case, focus around vision,
ethics, care, responsibility, and community. Individual humans are seen as embedded in,
or emergent from, larger wholes of society and nature. This side doesn't neglect science-in fact, it often takes inspiration from biology, the study of complexity, and the like. But
as one turns to doing economics, one emphasizes the connected and community aspects
of economic life. Models may take shape in words or images, and include or even
emphasize humans' intuitive capacities and emotions such as love, care, and awe. The
dynamic and very-long-run aspects of human interactions with the rest of nature are also
central. Big changes tend to be emphasized, such as needed paradigm shifts, new eras or
shifts in consciousness. Unexpected, creative, uncertain and even chaotic factors are not
only accepted, but even celebrated. The analysis appeals to human feelings of connection,
responsibility, love, and a desire for justice. The goal is to create new foundations for an
ecologically and socially sustainable society.
As a result of the broad, long-run and global justice focuses, ecological
economists coming from this side see an extremely urgent need for big changes in
economic life. Actions often take the directions of attempting to inspire changes in
consciousness (particularly concerning limits to through-put and consumption), build up
local community initiatives, create small-scale technologies, and put more of the
economy in the hands of non-profits and cooperatives. Often there is an implicit, if not
explicit, level of distrust felt about large scale or mechanical technologies; and/or central
governments; and/or money, markets, and for-profit businesses.
The role of ecological economists who start from this side is seen as one of being
collaborators in bottom-up movements for building a new society. Although some are
able to talk the language of economic theory and econometrics, a focus on short-term
policy changes is felt to be too limiting. Ecological economists from the "soft side" feel a
pressing need for new visions, new theories, new goals, and hope that this work will help
inspire positive change.

3

GDAE Working Paper No. 09-06: Between a Rock and a Soft Place

Individual ecological economists may, of course, identify strongly with one or the
other side of this rough typology, or with parts of each. At a cultural level, however, these
two approaches are, it seems, overwhelmingly thought of as widely separated and even
hostile. Either one is a scientific, neutral economist, or one is a mere subjective,
emotional human being, it is sometimes thought. Or: Either one is a money-grubbing
defender of industrial capitalism, or one is "one of us"--part of a small, stalwart, rightthinking group seeking to save humanity and the planet. Certainly most mainstream
economists see little role for discussion of ethics or holistic philosophy within serious
economic analysis. Likewise some ecological philosophers and advocates have nothing
good to say about business, markets, or quantification.
Is there, then, a stalemate? Or could it be that really addressing climate change
requires that we have less dualistic division in our thinking, and more rethinking of the
base assumptions on both sides? Could we do with more "both/and" and less "either/or"?
To answer these questions, let us go back to the roots of how we, in Western
contemporary culture, tend to think about nature...about gender…and about economics.

III. Feminist Economics: Explaining How the Either/Or Got Started
Women and nature share similar treatment in neoclassical economics. 1 They are,
variously, invisible; pushed into the background; treated as a “resource” for the
satisfaction of male or human needs; considered to be part of a realm that “takes care of
itself”; thought of as self-regenerating (or reproductive, as opposed to productive);
conceived of as passive; and/or considered to be subject to male or human authority. One
would search in vain in the most paradigmatic models of economics for any inkling of
where the materials used in production came from, or where the detritus from the
production process goes. Similarly, one would search in vain in most descriptions of
human agents for a discussion of where economic agents come from, or where they go
when they are broken or used up. Economic agents arrive, to quote Thomas Hobbes, “ . .
as if but even now sprung out of the earth, and suddenly, like mushrooms, come to full
maturity, without all kind of engagement to each other" (cited in Benhabib (1987)). The
bearing and raising of children, and the care of the aged and sick--traditionally women’s
responsibilities--are, like nature, too unimportant to mention.
The treatment of both women and nature as passive, exploitable resources is not,
however, just coincidental, or incidental to neoclassical analysis. Such thinking is part
of a broader cultural way of viewing the world, with roots going far back in history.
Feminist historians and philosophers of science including Evelyn Fox Keller (Keller
1985), Sandra Harding (1986), Brian Easlea (1980), and Val Plumwood (1993), brought
this to light in their work during the 1980s and early 1990s. Their central point is that
dualisms such as those in Table 1 have strongly influenced the Western conception of the
order of the world.
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Table 1: Splitting the World: Western Philosophy
Higher Order
"man"
mind
activity
order
male

Lower Order
nature
body
passivity
chaos
female

Such authors point out such dualisms within the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle,
Thomas Aquinas, and others; show how it runs deeply within many varieties of myth and
religion; and demonstrate how it permeated Enlightenment thought and the rise of
modern science, through figures including Rene Descartes and Francis Bacon.
One interpretation sometimes drawn from such examples is that women really are,
in some essential way, “closer to nature,” and therefore are perhaps the “natural” group
to take up the ecology cause and save the planet. Although there are some feminists who
take this view, most do not, and instead regard such a view simply reifying old
stereotypes. "Sex" is often used in the feminist literature to refer to biological differences
between males and females, while "gender" refers to cultural beliefs constructed on the
base of (preponderant) sexual dimorphism. 2 So the issue is not whether men are more
rational or less embodied than women: They manifestly are not. Rather, the point is that
there is a deep cultural pattern of defining male as being opposed to, and superior to,
female, and defining rationality as being opposed to, and superior to, nature, matter, and
emotion.
Contemporary psychology confirms, as well, that we tend to perceive the world
through "gender schemas"--that is, cognitive routines that save on mental effort by
associating wide range of qualities, objects, and fields with masculinity, and others with
femininity (Bem 1981; Nosek, Banaji et al. 2007). For example, sharp abstract shapes,
and dogs, are often coded as masculine, while rounded abstract shapes, and cats, are
mentally coded as feminine. We might call this "cognitive gender." While such mental
shortcuts often harmlessly speed up our thinking, they can also severely limit and bias
our thinking.
Other traits and concepts, beyond those mentioned above, also show this sort of
patterning. In particular, in the early 1990s, feminist economists began to notice that the
definition, models, and methods of mainstream economics followed just such a gender
schematic pattern, as shown in Table 2.
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Table 2: Splitting the World: Gender Schemas in Neoclassical Orthodoxy
Economics ("Hard")
Definition:
markets
mental choice
scarcity
Model:
individuality
autonomy
self-interest
rationality
Methods:
quantitative
formal
positive
objective
general
Gender:
masculine

Not Economics ("Soft")
nonmarket
bodily experience
abundance
relatedness
interdependence
other-interest
emotion
qualitative
verbal or intuitive
normative
subjective
particular
feminine

That is, when mainstream economics is defined as the study of either markets or
choice, non-market and bodily experience are neglected. The model of "economic man"
is of a autonomous, rational, self-interested actor; all interdependencies and emotions are
excluded. Even more than topic matter, methodology is often used to demarcate what is
or isn't economics: Quantitative mathematical models and empirical studies that aspire to
a value-free neutrality have the high prestige. Qualitative study and issues of ethics, or
any discussion of one's standpoint or position, are strenuously avoided. The cultural and
cognitive gender associations are clearly "masculine" and "hard" for the left column, and
"feminine" and "soft" for the right. We might diagram this perceived relationship
between gender and value as shown in Figure 1: masculinity is hard, superior, and virile;
femininity is associated with softness, inferiority, and emasculation.
Figure 1: The Hierarchical Gender Dualism
up
masculine superior virile
|
feminine inferior emasculated
down
These common habits of thinking tend to suggest that it is "masculine" and
"superior" to see ourselves as beings who are above nature, and that doing "good
economics" means distancing ourselves from each other and from ethical concerns. One
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way of trying to fight this paradigm might be to simply turn the tables, and value
everything in the "soft" column over everything in the "hard" column. That is, the only
alternative may seem to be to see the world in purely "holistic" terms, rejecting notions of
individuality and rationality in favor of immersion in experience. Markets and
quantitative analysis may be rejected as well, as essentially oppressive structures.
Flipping the chart in this way, however, does not challenge the dualism: It simply
substitutes one distinctly partial view of the world with another.

IV. Feminist Economics: Getting to Both/And
But a number of feminist philosophers and feminist economists have suggested a
different solution: Deconstructing the dualism itself. “A transformative feminism,” writes
ecofeminist philosopher Karen Warren (1987, 19, emphasis added),
would involve a psychological restructuring of our attitudes and
beliefs about ourselves and ‘our world’ (including the nonhuman
world), and a philosophical rethinking of the notion of the self such
that we see ourselves as both co-members of an ecological community
and yet different from other members of it.
That is, instead of accepting the old either/or, perhaps we can get to a more nuanced and
helpful both/and.
As a tool for developing this more flexible sort of thinking, a “gender-value
compass” (Nelson 1992; Nelson 1996) may be useful. Consider how the hierarchy
pictured in Figure 1, for example, changes if one refuses this overlay, and instead splits
off the gender axis from the value axis, as shown in Figure 2:
Figure 2:
Positive
M+
virility

F+
muliebrity

M–
?

F–
emasculation

Masculine

Feminine

Negative
Virility is defined in the dictionary as “manly vigor.” Emasculation is the lack
thereof. But are all things feminine just degraded forms of masculine characteristics? If
one looks hard enough in a sufficiently thick dictionary (or is persistent in web
searching), one can also find the new term in the figure. “Muliebrity” is defined as
“womanliness,” “possessing full womanly powers,” or “the feminine correlative of
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virility.” While not a term in common use, it suggests that alongside and on a par with a
masculine, positive strengths we might also consider there to be feminine, positive
strengths. The cross-diagonal terms illustrate a condition of lack: for example,
“emasculation” is an absence of “virility.” There is, unfortunately, currently no term in
the English language for a lack of womanly vigor.
Applying this sort of analysis to the relationship between individual humans and
nature (and between individual humans and society), we can think of people as being
both individuated and connected, as illustrated in Figure 3. The masculine extreme or
"separative" version (Nelson 1995; England 2003) overemphasizes the aspects that make
people different from each other, and human consciousness different from the rest of
nature. The feminine extreme or "soluble" version overemphasizes connection and
continuity, to the exclusion of individual or distinctive will, activity, or identity. Yet we
are a part of nature and constituted in our relationships, as well as able to think and act as
human beings and individuals.
Figure 3
M+
individual

F+
related

M–
separative

F–
soluble

The two negative quadrants of the diagram form a negative complementarity: Mr.
John Jones--imagined to be autonomous and independent--is represents the myth of the
separative self while Mrs. John Jones--whose own name is lost--represents the soluble
extreme. The two positive quadrants represent a positive complementarity: individualsin-relation.
We can also examine the idea that we have an either/or choice between
masculine, precise, quantitative methods and less precise qualitative analysis. Figure 4
suggests that there are costs to focusing only on precision, and benefits to be had by a
richer approach.
Figure 4
M+
precise
elegant

F+
rich,
realistic

M–
unrealistic,
thin

F–
imprecise,
vague
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That is, the weakness of overly precise analysis is that it becomes thin and
unrealistic. What is taken as a sign of "rigor," may often be more like "rigor mortis."
Analysis that aims to be rich and realistic, but forgets about precision, can end up being
simply vague. Good analysis aims at useful combinations of precision and richness.
Even the terms "hard" and "soft" can be deconstructed this way. Hardness is
usually associated with strength, but it can also mean rigidity, a illustrated in Figure 5.
Softness can mean weakness, but it can also indicate flexibility. A research program that
is rigid and weak is brittle, and breaks under the first criticism or adjustment to an
assumption. One that is strong and flexible is resilient, and can adapt to meet new
situations.
Figure 5
M+
hard,
strong

F+
soft,
flexible

M–
hard,
rigid

F–
soft,
weak

Two more points from the feminist analysis are relevant to the discussion of
ecological economics. First, there is the question of "objectivity." Hierarchical, dualistic
thinking also creates the following false “either/or” choice: either one does work
committed to social betterment or one does work that is scientifically objective. Feminist
scholars of science have revealed the sexist biases implicit in the belief that objectivity is
a matter of detachment. Feminist alternatives, such as those called “strong objectivity” by
Harding (1986), “dynamic objectivity” Keller (Keller 1985, 116), or "positional
objectivity" by economist Amartya Sen (Sen 1992) incorporate a more relational
approach. For example, as expressed by feminist philosopher Helen Longino, “The
objectivity of individuals…consists in their participation in the collective give-and-take
of critical discussion and not in some special relation (of detachment, hardheadedness)
they may bear to their observations” (1990, 79).
Second, there is the question of the definition of the field of economics.
Regarding subject matter, a definition of economics that does not rely on either a
masculine-biased definition based on markets and business firms, or a masculine-biased
definition based on rational choice theory, is one based on provisioning: Economics is
about how societies organize themselves to provide for the survival and flourishing of life
(Nelson 1993). Many ecological economists already use this definition or something like
it; others, however, still adhere to markets or scarcity.
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So, if the world is not in its essence divided between rocks and soft places, but
instead includes both, what does that mean for our analysis as ecological economists?

V. Starting from the Rock
Some fissures are beginning to appear in critical parts of the "rock" of "hard"
economic analysis of climate change. As strenuously as they might try to avoid the fact,
some mainstream economists are coming to realize that they need at least some bits of the
"soft" side if they are to act as responsible human beings in this time of climate crisis.
The most notable case of this, of course is that of Nicholas Stern, former Chief
Economist of the World Bank, and lead author of the United Kingdom Treasury's Stern
Review on the Economics of Climate Change (Stern 2006). While his mainstream
credentials are impeccable, and his Review made use of a great deal of modeling, he is
currently quite vocal about the limitations of conventional economic analysis. Ethics and
uncertainty, as well as international policy, must be "at the core" of any analysis,
according to Stern (Stern 2008, 2). Marginal analysis can at best be "supplementary" to
analysis, which must be complemented with understandings of "economic
history…country studies and particular studies of the context and issues in question"
(Stern 2008, 3). These positions, of course, challenge the gendered dualisms just
reviewed on a number of dimensions.
Martin Weitzman's recent work does not go as far as Stern's in accepting the
necessity of a both/and approach, but he does bridge parts of the divide. Weitzman claims
that "the incredible magnitude of the deep structural uncertainties that are involved in
climate change analysis" can no longer be ignored, and introduces fat-tailed probability
distributions into Integrated Assessment Models (IAM) to account for it (Weitzman 2009,
18). While the mathematical model is "rock" style, the centrality of uncertainty is novel,
and some of his other assumptions, conclusions, and reflections also come from the "soft
place." Weitzman openly uses terms like "raw intuition" (14) and "subjective" (18, 19) to
describe views he nevertheless strongly holds. He arrives at a prescription of more
emphatic action than many of his modeling colleagues. And he is critical of standard
modeling in ways that many ecological economists will find familiar, criticizing them for
"misplaced concreteness" (18), pretensions to precision where precision is not possible
(18), and "deluding ourselves and others" with results characterized by an "artificial
crispness." He also distances himself from the usual implicit idea that conventional
models incorporate self-evident eternal truths: He refers to utility theory as a human
creation—"the discipline-imposing form of (present discounted) expected utility theory"
(1-2, emphasis added)—and explains economist's loyalty to some aspects of modeling in
emotional terms—"the comfort that economists feel" with them (16).
Weitzman continues, however, to emphatically disdain any role for ethics in
economic analysis, characterizing the Stern Review's choice of discount rate as
paternalistic, and putting the term "ethics" in scare quotes whenever he uses it (Weitzman
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2007; Weitzman 2009). 3 His recommendations for action run more towards large-scale
bioengineering than towards social change (17). He still also feels obliged, in his last
words, to claim exactness and rigor for his analysis (18). But there is an important
admission, here, however small, that the tools of "hard" analysis alone are not up to the
job of addressing climate change.
Even Richard Tol, who has been a vocal defender of Nordhaus-style "go slow"
prescriptions (2009), has noticed that the policy prescriptions arising from the most
popular IAMs do not correspond to what he believes actually needs to be done. For
example, in one recent article--after reviewing the results of models run by himself,
Nordhaus, and others--Richard Tol (2008) writes:
Nonetheless, the policy suggested by cost-benefit analysis – emission
reduction, but not enough to stabilize emissions let alone concentrations –
is intuitively wrong. It cannot be the case that the best policy is to let the
world get warmer and warmer and warmer still… [c]ommon sense
suggests that climate change should be stopped at a lower level. Our best
estimates challenge the common sense, but it is as yet unclear whether our
research findings are superior to our gut feelings. (439, emphasis added)
The rest of the article goes back and forth between parts which, in accord with Tol's
intuition, lean towards faster policy changes and concern with equity, and parts which
show a pronounced allegiance to "hard-nosed neo-classical" (439) methodology and a
view of the economist as neutral observer bound to observe the "reality" of decisionmakers' tendency to follow selfish interests. While he remains mostly on the vocal "go
slow" side, he gives a slight indication here, at least, that perhaps the "hard" models are
not the last word.
If fissures such as those opened by Stern, and to some extent Weitzman (and
possibly Tol), could widen into a chink, and then a gap, perhaps more "hard" researchers
will come to see the necessity of allowing for, and valuing, the side of the world
stereotyped as "soft," and accepting that one cannot be an economist without being a
human as well.
Would it helpful to accept these larger values, and then, since we are trained as
economics, to continue generating our usual IAM models or CBA studies—that is,
continue to aspire to "build a better model"? Some will argue that standard, marginalist
CBA or cost-effectiveness analysis can still play a central role in determining the most
efficient way to reach goals, once proper climate change goals have been set by social
and ethical discussion. There are reasons, however, to doubt that this may not be the most
effective way to use economists' energies right now, if we are to deal adequately with the
climate crisis.
The first reason is that the core assumptions of the models themselves emphasize
things that may, at this point in history, be more distracting than helpful. Efficiency
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concerns, central to such modeling, are, in the present case, of second order importance at
best. The models emphasize small changes, monetary valuation, individual-self interest,
and individual utility from consumption--all of which tend to take us in exactly the
wrong direction. A narrow focus on marginalist modeling may serve to dangerously
detract economists, policymakers', and the public's attention from the more important
questions of equity, large changes, and community. In a more balanced future world,
perhaps, CBA will have given up its pretense to sole scientific prestige, and efficiency
taken its place as one among many social goals. For this to come to pass, however, the
tools of formalization, measurement, and modeling would need to be recognized as
particular tools--tools that are helpful for some tasks and not for others. Such humility
seems hard to come by: Economists equipped with the elegant "hammers" of modeling
and econometrics often tend to "see any problem as a nail." In the meantime, the basic
assumptions of conventional welfare economics simply strike the wrong chord.
Second, the fact that models are extremely sensitive to the specification of
assumptions, and very dependent on projections of a radically uncertain future, makes
them very easy to misuse in policy evaluation. For example, there is a disturbing
tendency on the part of some environmental groups to want, from economists, "studies"
that show that preventing climate change will be "good for the economy" in terms of
GDP growth, and will not change people's lives very much. One could, of course, by
suitably upping the technology parameters, for example, provide such models. And these
could, arguably, by proper dissemination around the Hill, be useful in getting some
climate change legislation passed. Such an approach, however, would sacrifice more
important long-term goals for rather minor short-term gains. No one who takes the longrun climate change science seriously believes that the problem would be adequately
addressed by the rather modest sorts of legislation currently considered politically viable.
No one who takes issues of global environmental justice seriously believes that the
patterns of consumption, transportation, and residence of those in the rich parts of the
world can continue more or less unchanged.
Not only would a short-term, "better model" strategy potentially destroy the
credibility of ecological economics--as people figure out, in the longer term, that they
were offered false hopes—there is also evidence that it might not be as effective as other
tactics. The "better model" strategy relies on the "rock"-side political assumptions that
people are self-interested and rational, and take measured steps towards well-thought-out
goals. It assumes that policymaking is actually a reasoned process in which legislators
try to decide what is best for their constituents. While as academics we are often biased
towards thinking of people as rational, considerable evidence tells us that this is not how
important policies are enacted. Consider how, until recent elections, low- and middleincome people consistently voted against their own economic self-interest in electing
Republican leadership. George Lakoff's book Don’t Think of an Elephant (2004) is a
damning critique of the use of technocratic self-interest language by Democrats in the
United States, that allowed the Republicans a free hand in framing their proposals around
the more mobilizing grounds of values, national identity, and emotional security.
Consider Afghanistan and Iraq. No one in the United States Congress demanded a
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detailed cost-benefit analysis of each aspect of these policies, before authorizing funds.
When matters of national pride, and (in these cases, somewhat irrational and debilitating)
fear--emotional issues from the "soft" side of the cultural dualism--are foremost, the
leaders wanting a policy know that the person-as-consumer will yield the front seat to the
person-as-citizen or person-who-wants-security. Emotional mobilization based on fear
can, of course, be dangerous, and lead to rising fascism. But using this as an excuse to
dismiss all emotional and value-based motivations is short-sighted. What we need in
regard to climate change is not another model, but a mobilization on the order of going to
war…only much bigger.
Economists skilled in these areas can serve an important role in pointing out
exactly how biased and assumption-sensitive the economic models prescribing slow
changes are, and so help debunk the idea that policymakers should accept their solutions
as representing good science. We can show that the existing models are bad models. But
this negative role is the major thing this approach can contribute.
"Rock" side ecological economists will not be terribly happy with the idea of
backing away from the usual tools. There is a natural human inclination to want to put
one's skills, in which one has deeply invested, to good use. We teach our undergraduates,
however, that rational decision making requires ignoring sunk costs—that is, past
resource allocations that are now "water under the bridge." Rational decision-making, we
say, means moving on to see a problem in terms of current and future issues. At this point
in our history, and facing the particular problem of climate change, economists need to
recognize that our modeling and econometric skills, however hard-earned, may not be
what the world most needs right now.
On the issue of climate change, "rock" people need to recognize the limits of
traditional tools, recognize the unity of being both human and scholarly, and be ready to
speak out more, on a gut level, about values, visions, the need for big changes, and the
importance of human and ecological community.

VI. Starting from the Soft Place
The fact that "rock" people need to move towards being more "soft" does not,
however, mean that the "soft" people were right all along. The feminist analysis presented
earlier suggests that being one-sided along "soft" lines is no great improvement, but
rather a continuation of old dualisms from just another angle.
The flaw in "soft place" analysis that is most relevant to climate change policy is
in the attitude often taken towards money, profit, business, competition, and markets.
Or, to put it more in the lingo of the field: towards the system of global industrial
corporate capitalism. It is no exaggeration to say that in much of this literature, global
industrial corporate capitalism is seen as a monolithic enemy, and the sole cause of
environmental and social degradation. The alternative envisioned, then, it seems, must
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differ on every point: The new society must be local, back-to-nature, non-profit, and
cooperative.
Those who take this flip-side approach are actually, in an important sense, dyedin-the-wool neoclassical economists--Friedmanites, if you will. Major tenants of
neoclassical orthodoxy include:
•
•
•
•

People are purely self-interested in their economic dealings.
Businesses are all about making profits.
The laws of markets are inexorable, like the laws of physics.
Social and ethical aspects of humanity belong to a realm separate from business
and markets.

If one assumes that commercial life is intrinsically mechanical and anti-social then the
idea of "socially and environmentally responsible corporations" is an oxymoron. Any
sign of pro-environmental action can be dismissed as so much "greenwashing." Milton
Friedman once famously said, “Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very
foundations of our free society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social
responsibility other than to make as much money for their stockholders as possible”
(1982, 133). Replace "free society" with "oppressive society," and the extreme softsiders would agree unequivocally that this is the way that modern capitalism works.
But is it?
Feminist analysis--as well as analysis from law, history, and elsewhere-demonstrates that this dualism between "hard" economics and "soft" society is wildly
overblown. In fact, the notion that firms maximize profits was not derived from careful
study of business behavior. Rather, it was invented by neoclassical economists because it
gives the illusion that firm behavior can be adequately analyzed using the tools of
calculus. 4 The assumption of profit maximization “lent an attractive patina of scientific
rigor,” writes legal scholar Lynn A. Stout, to the study of corporations. It entered popular
discourse because the business press found that it offered “an easy-to-explain, sound-bite
description” of what corporations are and do (2005, 4-5). If, on the other hand, the
economy is actually part of society, and business firms are--like other organizations-made up of actual human people with a variety of goals, feelings, values, and abilities,
then perhaps the goal of social and environmental responsibility need not be so quickly
dismissed.
The belief that firms are mechanical profit-maximizers, however, can be hard to
overcome. Many believe, for example that profit maximization is mandated by law. But
an actual examination of the relevant state legal codes shows that it is not so. Corporate
codes usually simply state that a corporation’s purpose is to engage in business or trade.
In the section on formation and purposes in the most commonly used corporate codes
(those of the state of Delaware) the words “profit” or “return to shareholders” are
nowhere mentioned. Case law doesn’t require it, either. While the directors and
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managers of corporations have a “fiduciary duty” (duty of loyalty or care) to the
corporation, this duty is not limited to shareholders or profits. Legal scholars note that in
the contemporary United States, “each state implicitly recognizes that a broader group of
interests may be considered,” such as those of employees, customers, creditors, and local
communities (Adams and Matheson 2000, 1088). A diverse understanding of obligations
is also found among corporate directors themselves. One survey found that only a
minority of directors felt obligated only to shareholders; most directors feel obligated to
more than one constituency. 5 Making a good faith effort to earn profits is, indeed, one of
the important responsibilities of a business manager. But achieving the highest profit
without regard to any other goal is not required by law.
If the law doesn’t require a relentless focus on profits, it this perhaps forced by
“market discipline”? Many believe that the pressures of competitive markets will sooner
or later drive all companies that are not ruthless profit-maximizers out of business. And,
indeed, parts of the global economy are highly competitive. Clothing subcontractors
dealing with large branded companies or major retailers, for example, have to compete
fiercely with each other. But Wal-Mart, Exxon Mobil, Verizon, UPS, Microsoft and the
like are hardly the sort of anonymous, powerless companies that populate the neoclassical
theory of perfect competition. The economic conditions they face do not dictate their
decisions to them: they run with some “slack” and room for discretion. Now, the
question is what the leaders of such companies choose to do with the difference between
revenues and strictly necessary costs. The leaders can choose to increase compensation
and perks for executives, lobby for laws that benefit only them, and so on—actions that
may contribute little to (or even diminish) long-run shareholder wealth. Sound familiar?
Or the leaders of a company running with some slack can choose to invest in green
technology, check that its subcontractors comply with environmental standards, and take
initiative on conservation. There is no legal or economic “mechanism” that dictates that
corporate leaders have to go one way or the other. Corporate leaders face choices--moral
choices. Some of them, in fact, are humans beings who worry whether the world will be a
good place for their grandchildren.
Feminist scholarship also reminds us that small, local, organizations not dedicated
to profit are not necessarily well-behaved. While many theorists idealize "the family" as
the heart of love and connection, for example, feminists are only too aware of the women
and children crowding domestic violence shelters.
A "both/and" view of business and markets sees in them both potential for great
harm, and potential for good. In part, what results from business behavior is a result of
the laws and institutions that create the framework for commerce. As we have seen in the
ongoing financial crisis, in some places our systems of social oversight have been much
too weak, and policymakers have put far too much trust in the role of self-policing. But
the results are also in part a result of what people in business themselves, believe
themselves to be doing. To the extent that neoclassical orthodoxy and "soft place" critics
both insist that business leaders value monetary returns over everything else, they can
hardly be blamed for doing what we say.
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From a policy point of view, extreme "soft place" approaches tend to be very
local, or very utopian. One can sometimes make changes at a town or regional level. One
can take hope in small victories. Those that imagine that nothing short of the complete
dismantling of the entire system of global industrial corporate capitalism will save the
earth, however, seem to talk more to each other, than to policymakers. Even when the
message about damage done by the corporate monolith gets the sympathy of an average
(probably corporate-employed) American, it may leave them feeling simply
overwhelmed. Sometimes the analysis is also quite backward-looking, romanticizing a
rural lifestyle and pure wilderness aesthetic when, in fact, the most sustainable way of
supporting humans and other species into the future may include taking advantage of a
number of urban and industrial innovations.
On the issue of climate change, treating corporations as irremediable enemies
takes us in exactly the wrong direction. In formulating effective responses to this
problem, "soft place" people need to recognize the narrowness of an analysis that treats
businesses and markets as radically separate from society and ethics. We need to
recognize our common humanity with corporate leaders, and support movements towards
both a greater social role in directing business and investment, and greater social and
environmental responsibility by those in positions of private-sector leadership. There
needs to be no less insistence on the ethical, caring, and life-preserving mandates for
addressing climate change, and the size of the social and ethical changes needed to get to
true sustainability. But it is also necessary to more rigorously question dogmas that tell us
we live in a split world.

VII. Conclusion: Between a Rock and a Soft Place
As ecological economists, we are uniquely situated to play an important role in
environmental, and especially climate change, debates. Our skills in discussing the
economy put us directly into the policy fray. Our ecology-sustaining goals make us look
towards long-term and transformative solutions. Bringing these together, we can, if we
choose, become leaders in envisioning and building a new economic foundation for
sustainable human and biospheric communities. If, however, we hold on tightly to our
macho traditional methods on the one hand, or, on the other hand, to our rejection of the
sphere of commerce, we may lose our chance.
We are, indeed, between a rock and a soft place. Feminist analysis suggests that
there is tremendous dynamic energy to be found in embracing the tensions of our unique
location. Can we proceed with an attitude of "both/and" rather than "either/or"?
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NOTES
1

For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Nelson (1997). For introductions to feminist economic analysis
for those unfamiliar with the field, see Ferber and Nelson (1993; 2003).
2
Recent feminist literature has become more complicated as scholars deal with intersexuality,
transsexuality, and the like. But the sex/gender distinction provides a rough typology that is useful when
examining cultural stereotypes.
3
For a longer discussion of this point, see Nelson(2008)
4
For more on this, see Nelson (2006)
5
Jay W. Lorsch and Elizabeth Maciver, Pawns or Potentates (1989) as cited in D. Gordon Smith (1998,
291). See also the discussion in Sen (1983).
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